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Abstract
This paper develops a theory of the endogenous formation of a common market in
a three{country, two{factor political economy model. In the status quo, Home and
Foreign implement non-discriminatory policies towards international factor °ows, as to
maximize the domestic median voter's welfare. Each of the two countries simultane-
ously holds then a referendum on a Common Market initiative leading to the removal
of the pre-existing policies for factor °ows occurring between the member countries,
while no coordination is imposed on policies vis-µ a-vis the rest of the world. Several
interesting results emerge. In a common market, factors moving between the members
are more likely to gain, the bigger is the import demand of one country as compared
to the factor supply of the exporting partner. Factors which instead do not relocate
are more likely to see their return decrease when °ows are big and import demands
are inelastic. Importantly, for the common market to emerge as an equilibrium, some
factors must continue to experience enhanced protection when the integration process
is completed. This result highlights the potential tension between social desirability
and political feasibility of the integration process.
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11 Introduction
The emergence of preferential trading arrangements, i.e. of agreements between countries to
systematically remove restrictions on bilateral trade °ows, is a well known phenomenon
that has captured the interest of trade economists since the pioneering study by Viner
(1950) on the economics of customs unions. As of 2004, more than 200 Preferential Trading
Arrangements (PTA's) were in force, and a vast literature has emerged to analyze their
working. Both normative questions like \under which conditions is a preferential trading
arrangement welfare improving?",1 as well as positive questions like \Under which conditions
will a Free Trade Area emerge as a result of a given political process?"2 have been addressed,
and attention has also been dedicated to the potential e®ects of regional arrangements on
the multilateral trading system.3 So far the focus has been on analyzing free trade areas
or customs unions, but the recent experience of the most successful PTA, the European
Union, calls for new research on the way the integration process deepens, moving beyond
commercial liberalization. In particular, surprisingly little has been said on the democratic
foundations behind the decision of a group of countries to bilaterally liberalize factor °ows,
and this paper represents a ¯rst attempt at answering this question.4
The need for a deeper understanding of the political forces behind the creation of a
Common Market emerges very clearly from the recent debate on the Eastern expansion of
the European Union and on the possible accession of Turkey. On the one hand we read of
new members fearing that \...foreigners (...) would descend `like crows' and pick the country
apart"5, depriving local residents of the ownership of large chunks of the country's productive
assets. On the other, rich western European countries have been wary of the risk of a massive
in°ow of East European workers, and the mythical \Polish plumber" seems to have played an
important role in determining the recent French rejection of the EU constitution.6 Since in
many countries the various treaties behind the deepening of the European PTA have become
e®ective only after having been rati¯ed by referenda (or parliamentary vote),7 understanding
1See Kemp and Wan (1976) and Grinols (1981).
2See for instance Grossman and Helpman (1995).
3See the volume by Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagaryia (1999) for a systematic exposition of the literature.
4For a discussion of the related literature, see Section 2.
5The Economist, March 23d 2002, page 48 \Polish Land: A most emotional issue".
6See \French voters soundly reject European Union Constitution' by Elaine Sciolino in The New York
Times, May 30 2005.
7Besides the recent Dutch and French referenda on the EU constitution, other examples of non-rati¯cation
are the Danish vote in June 1992 on the Maastricht Treaty and the Irish vote in June 2001 on the Nice treaty.
1the role of the democratic process in shaping policy towards international factor mobility
becomes particularly important.
To this end, we develop a three{country, two{factor model, where in the status quo Home
and Foreign choose non{discriminatory policies towards international factor °ows in order to
maximize the domestic median voter's welfare. A referendum is then simultaneously called
in Home and Foreign on a common market initiative, i.e. on the preferential elimination of
policy interventions towards factor °ows between the two countries. In framing the incentives
that in°uence the creation of a Common Market, we assume that every potential member
retains the power to autonomously set policies towards external factor °ows throughout
the process.8 Hence, when the majority of residents in both countries decides to liberalize
factor °ows, the government in each country resets the policy intervention toward the rest
of the world, taking into account the change in the median voter's welfare following the
relocation of productive factors within the common market. Therefore, the formation of the
common market is modelled as a simultaneous move game between the median voters of
the two countries that decide non-cooperatively whether to vote in favor of the initiative,
anticipating that for any outcome of the referendum, the government will continue to set
policies toward the rest of the world to maximize their welfare.
The model gives rise to several interesting results. On the one hand, pre-existing di®er-
ences in the returns, combined with the liberalization of factor °ows, imply that gains are
likely to occur for those factors that actually move within the Common Market. At the same
time, those factors which end up not relocating are likely to be made worse o®, compared
to the status quo. For the integration process to be sustained as a political equilibrium, the
gains accruing to the median voter must more than compensate his losses, and the balance
between the two depends both on the di®erences between the two countries' initial factor
endowments, as well as on the elasticity of factor demand. When the di®erences in initial
endowments lead to large factor °ows and/or when the factor demand is rigid, the losses
become sizable, and from the point of view of the median voter are likely to o®set the poten-
8This assumption seem to capture well the recent European Union's experience. In that context, several
attempts to coordinate policy have been made, but the in°uence of the resulting agreements has been limited.
In fact, the Schengen acquis translates mainly in the homogenization of border controls, while individual
countries have retained most of the powers to independently set migratory policies. Similarly, e®orts for the
coordination of policies towards asylum{seekers are limited, as discussed in Facchini, Lorz, and Willmann
(2006). Turning to foreign direct investment, the EU treaty contains explicit provisions aimed at limiting
the use of state aid to companies, but the Commission has withhold wide reaching discretionary power to
grant exceptions to the general ban on the use of such instruments (Oman (2000)).
2tial bene¯ts. On the other hand, if factor movements are small and/or the factor demand is
elastic, the integration process is likely to lead to a situation of enhanced protection,9 and
consequently emerge as the political equilibrium. Therefore, the political economy impli-
cations of our analysis are quite striking. Although opportunities for e±ciency gains from
factors' mobility lie at the foundation of the Common Market initiative, °ows that are `too
large' can harm the political feasibility of the integration process by reducing the protection
granted to factors that do not relocate.
The distribution of factor's ownership is important to determine the chances of a suc-
cessful integration. In particular, the median voter is more likely to support the integration
process, the higher is his share of the relocating factor, and the closer to the average is his
share of the non-relocating one. Importantly, when the median voter owns a below average
share of capital (concentrated capital ownership), the common market will not be formed
because the capital poor country will be unambiguously hurt by the integration. A similar
outcome occurs when the two countries are quite di®erent in terms of factor endowments
(asymmetric country sizes). We also show that, if the distribution of factor ownership is
not too extreme, the use of policy instruments like a quota, that allow only imperfect rent
capturing will make the formation of the common market more likely. Hence, the general
message of our analysis is that, for the Common Market initiative to succeed, some amount
of protection will always be required for the factor that is not exported. Therefore, the fate
of the preferential agreement we are analyzing rests unavoidably on its ability to perpetu-
ate some distortion on factor returns. While this result is per se interesting, it highlights
the potential tension between social desirability and political feasibility of the integration
process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie°y discusses the related
literature, while in section 3 the model is developed and in section 4 a characterization of
the ex{ante policy is provided. Next, we consider the economic implications of the creation
of a common market (section 5) and in section 6 we derive our main results. Section 7
discusses a series of extensions to our main results, while section 8 concludes the paper.
9We will de¯ne this concept more precisely in section 5.
32 Related Literature
The growing importance of international factor °ows has spurred renewed interest in the
endogenous formation of policies towards factor movements.10 While several papers have
tackled narrowly de¯ned questions,11 Benhabib (1996) has considered how migratory poli-
cies that impose capital and/or skill requirements will be determined under majority voting
if the polity maximizes its income. The setting allows for two factors, capital and labor, so
that under direct democracy the policy will be chosen by the voter endowed with the median
capital{labor ratio. The main message of this elegant model is that complementarities be-
tween the median voter's and the potential immigrant's factor endowment will determine the
policy chosen.12 Unfortunately, the assumption of constant returns to scale in production
gives rise to a problematic result: the number of immigrants in equilibrium can be potentially
unlimited, and this appears at odds with actual policies followed by most countries. Facchini
and Willmann (2005), in a related paper, avoid this di±culty by assuming decreasing returns
to scale in the mobile factors. The endogenous formation of policies towards factor move-
ments is there the result of the interaction between lobbies representing organized factors
and elected politicians. Policies can take the form of both taxes (subsidies) or quantitative
restrictions, and in equilibrium the amount of protection granted depends both on whether
the factor is organized or not, and on the degree of complementarity between inputs. The
setup of this paper shares elements of both these models. On the one hand, the ex-ante
policy towards factor movements and the decision to join the Common Market are the result
of direct democracy, like in Benhabib (1996). On the other, the setup of the economy is (a
simpli¯ed version of) the multi-factor model developed by Facchini and Willmann (2005),
and the ex-ante non-discriminatory policy chosen involves taxes on in°ows and, potentially,
quantitative restrictions. Furthermore, while both previous papers focus on the policies of a
single country, here we are interested in exploring the spillovers generated by the interaction
of multiple jurisdictions.
The last problem has already been analyzed in two contexts that are related to the one
we consider: commercial integration and the formation of economic unions. Commercial
integration i.e., the formation of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions, has been studied in
10For a survey, see Facchini (2004), while for an early normative analysis, see Wooton (1988).
11See for instance Scholten and Thum (1996) and Razin and Sadka (1999) for interesting studies on the
political economy of migration in presence of a social security system.
12For an extension to a dynamic setting see Ortega (2005)
4the papers by Grossman and Helpman (1995), Richardson (1993) and Cadot, de Melo, and
Olarreaga (1999), among others.13 In the ¯rst contribution, the decision of two countries to
join a free trade area is the result of lobbying activity by the organized owners of speci¯c
factors and the e®ects of the creation of a Free Trade Area on ex post tari® rates vis-µ a-vis
the rest of the world are not explicitly analyzed. This problem is addressed by Richardson
(1993), in a reduced form political{support function model and by Cadot, de Melo, and
Olarreaga (1999), in the Grossman and Helpman's (1995) framework. In our paper, we also
take into account that the optimal policies chosen toward the rest of the world when the
common market is created di®er from the initial status quo, but the political outcome is the
result of a voting game rather than the interaction between organized lobbies.
At the other end of the spectrum, the growing institutional integration among western
European countries has given rise to renewed interest in the mechanisms underlying the cre-
ation of economic unions, and in the welfare properties of the political outcome. Bolton and
Roland (1997) develop a model of the uni¯cation and break{up of nations, in which from the
point of view of social welfare, separation is never optimal. In a setting in which jurisdictions
are characterized by di®erent income distributions and the level of redistribution is chosen
by majority voting, they obtain several interesting results. First of all, in their two{country
model, perfect factor mobility brings about factor price equalization and thus the same per
capita and median income. In our three country setting instead, by retaining control over
policies towards the rest of the world, perfect factor mobility between members of the com-
mon market does not lead to factor price equalization. Second, Bolton and Roland (1997)
show that greater heterogeneity in income distribution between regions works against uni¯-
cation. We ¯nd a similar result by considering asymmetries in factor endowments. Finally,
they discuss how barriers vis{µ a{vis non-member countries play a key role in cementing the
Union. We ¯nd a similar result in our paper, when we show that a common market is formed
only if factors continue to experience enough protection vis{µ a{vis the rest of the world.14
Perotti (2001) studies the degree of income redistribution and factor mobility that would
be chosen in a two-country setting by majority voting. Asymmetries in the labor markets
13Several papers have also explored the e®ects of the endogenous formation of preferential trading arrange-
ments from the point of view of aggregate well being of participating and excluded countries. Yi (1996) ¯nds
for instance that the formation of a customs union increases the aggregate welfare of the member countries,
but reduces the welfare of non{member countries.
14In a related paper, Bolton and Roland (1996) study the e®ect of factor mobility on the formation of a
union, considering di®erent sources of heterogeneity in the preferences for the public good.
5are the main driving force of the model, and no attention is paid to the policies undertaken
towards the rest of the world. The latter are key in understanding the results of our paper
where the source of heterogeneity between the potential member countries are factor en-
dowments rather than di®erent institutional settings. In two related recent papers, Alesina,
Angeloni, and Etro (2001) and Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro (2005) consider the problem of
the optimal institutional design of a union, as well as that of the endogenous determination
of its size and composition. The driving force of their model is a tension between the advan-
tages of internalizing potential spillovers and the heterogeneity of countries' preferences, and
the most interesting result is that the political equilibrium implies a bias towards excessive
centralization and small Union size, that calls for a careful design of the constitutional rules.
In a similar setting Brou and Ruta (2006) model also the role of interest groups, showing
that countries in which more groups are organized gain from political integration. In our
paper we limit our attention to a less intrusive form of economic integration i.e., a common
market, and the integration is not so much the result of the presence a market failure, but
of potential income gains brought about by factor movements between member countries.
3 The model
We are now ready to introduce the economic environment within which we analyze the
determination of policy towards international factor mobility. Let Z = fH;F;Rg denote
the set of three countries we will consider, where z = H is Home, z = F is Foreign and
z = R is the Rest of the World. We assume that both Home and Foreign are \small" in the
sense that the two countries cannot in°uence international factor prices, while country R is
not explicitly modeled. Home and Foreign are identical with the exception of mobile factor
endowments.15
For simplicity, and since the focus of this paper is on international factor movements, we
assume that each country produces the same consumption good16 using two mobile inputs,
15We will generalize our analysis in section 7.
16By assuming that the two countries produce the same good, we do not explicitly consider trade in this
model. Furthermore, we are also ignoring the e®ects that the international relocation of production factors
might have on consumer prices. While these assumptions are made to keep the analysis tractable, the existing
empirical evidence suggests that the relocation of production factors has small e®ects on good prices. In a
recent study Cortes (2006), using a sample of 25 US cities, ¯nds that the e®ects of a 10 percent increase in
immigration decreases the price of non{tradable goods by 0.7 percent.
6capital (K) and labor (L).17 Each country is populated by a continuum of agents, and
the population size is normalized to one. Each agent in [0;1] is indexed by i. Country
z total endowment of mobile factors is described by the vector `z = (`z
K;`z
L), i.e. we are
assuming that a country's autarkic factor supply is inelastic. Let ¸z
ij be the fraction of factor
j 2 fK;Lg supplied by agent i in country z, with
R
¸z
ijdi = 1,18 and let mz
j be the quantity
of factor j that is imported by country z (exported if negative). The total supply of factor j




j > 0 for all j and z, i.e. each country
imports both factors.
To produce a single consumption good, Home and Foreign share the same technology
described by a di®erentiable and separable production function Y = F(Lz
K;Lz
L) for which
there exists a well de¯ned pro¯t function, and the corresponding monetary payment can
be interpreted as the compensation received by an immobile factor.19 Country z's factor
demands LzD
j can then be derived from the pro¯t function via Hotelling's lemma. As for
prices, we choose aggregate output as the num¶ eraire, and the international real factor returns,
i.e. the returns prevailing in R, are set equal to one. We de¯ne ­z as the (bounded) set of
real factor prices prevailing in country z, and a vector !z = f!z
K;!z
Lg represents a point in
this set, while ¼(!z) =
P
j ¼j(!z
j),20 is the corresponding pro¯t function.
The governments in Home and Foreign can either restrict or promote factor °ows using
a combination of quotas/taxes/subsidies, that are assumed to be chosen to maximize the
welfare of the majority of the native population within each country. The use of any of
these instruments creates a gap between the domestic and the international factor return. In
other words, the policy intervention translates into a change in the factor return and thus,
in the small open economies we are considering, the domestic factor return conveys all the
information on the direct consequences of the government intervention. To see this point,
consider Figure 1, where we illustrate the e®ect of the introduction of a binding quota qj on
17In an earlier version of the paper, Facchini and Testa (2005) we considered a slightly more general model
with n inputs. In that setting we showed how an increase in the heterogeneity across countries, as captured
by the share of factors abundant in one country, could lead to a common market not being created.
18We are assuming that the distribution of factor ownership is atomless i.e., that every agent only owns a
tiny fraction of each factor's supply. Notice that if we denote with `z





j. Since population size is normalized to 1, `z
j is also the average supply of factor j in










ijdi = 1 and this holds for every j 2 J. In
other words, ¸z
ij can be interpreted as the holding of factor j by agent i relative to the population average.
19Land is the natural candidate in this context. Notice that this assumption rules out the agglomeration
dynamics that are central in the new economic geography models.













Figure 1: The e®ect of a quota
factor j in country z. In the ¯gure, !z
j(qj) is the wage prevailing in the domestic market as a
result of the restriction, and !z
j(qj)¡1 is the rent associated to the introduction of the quota,
i.e. the gap between the domestic and the international wage. Depending on the mechanism
through which the quotas are allocated, a fraction °j 2 [0;1] of this rent will be captured by
the government introducing the policy. For instance, in the case of an immigration quota,
we expect °j 2 (0;1), i.e. the government captures only part of the di®erence between the
international and the domestic factor return, while the remainder accrues to the immigrant.21
At the same time, if an in°ow tax (subsidy) is instead used, °j = 1 and the revenues (the
burden) of the policy accrue (are born) by the country's government. Thus, if capital °ows
are restricted by the introduction of a tax, we expect rent capturing to be complete.
Assuming that all ¯scal transfers, together with the return to the ¯xed factor, are lump
sum equally rebated to the domestic population, the welfare of each citizen i in country z is
described by the following expression:
21There are several reasons for why migrants are likely to capture only part of the surplus associated to the
quota. First of all, in countries where temporary working visas are employer-sponsored, such institutional
arrangement introduces an arti¯cial limit on labor market mobility, and leads to lower wages being received by
immigrant workers. We would like to thank Gordon Hanson for suggesting this interpretation. Furthermore,
there is substantial empirical evidence pointing out how the assimilation of migrants is slow, i.e. migrants
earn less than natives with similar labor market characteristics (Borjas 1999). Second, many countries apply
di®erent ¯scal treatments to natives vis µ a vis migrants: this involves both di®erent tax schedules, but also



























ij is the share of factor j owned by citizen i, the ¯rst term on the
right hand side of equation (1) represents i's total factor income. The second term describes






°j 2 [0;1] is the share of these transfers that are captured by the host country government.




the general formulation we have chosen for the transfers brought about by the introduction of
the policy, allows us to simultaneously describe the e®ects of quotas/taxes/subsidies towards
factor °ows.
As it is evident from equation 1, each individual i's preference for the policy applied
to factor j depends only on his ownership share of that particular factor. The preference





















In other words, if an individual i would be asked to choose his optimal policy towards factor j,
because of separability he would choose the policy that maximizes uz
ij(!z
j). If the subutility
function uz
ij(!z
j) is single peaked in prices,23 individuals can be ranked according to their
most preferred policy. Hence, there exists a continuum of citizens distributed according to
their preferences for the policy towards each factor and we denote by m the median voter of
this distribution, which is assumed to be the same for both factors.
Given the initial set of restrictions/subsidies (i.e. the policies chosen in the status quo),
the two countries hold a referendum allowing their citizens to remove barriers to factor
mobility between each other, while the policies toward the rest of the world are re-optimized
to maximize the welfare of the majority of the native population.24 The common market
22In other words, the second and third terms represent the average ¯scal transfer and average pro¯t
redistributed. Note that we are assuming that the shares are the same for pro¯ts as well as ¯scal revenues.
If we were to relax this assumption, our qualitative results would carry through as long as the correlation
between the two distribution rules is su±ciently high. Since we don't have an informed prior concerning this
correlation, we prefer to work with the convenient assumption of identical distribution rules.
23For example, uz
ij(!z
j) is single peaked when factor demands are linear.
24The optimal restrictions/subsidies toward the rest of the world will stay unchanged if the common market
9is formed if the majority of the population in each country votes in favor of it and in the
remainder of the paper we will assume that a favorable vote will be cast if and only if a citizen
strictly gains from the integration process. When the referendum takes place, the median
voter is decisive for the ¯nal outcome.25 More formally, the creation of a common market is
modeled as a simultaneous move game in which the median voters of the two countries have
two strategies at their disposal i.e., fJoin, Stay Outg and where the median voter's welfare
represents the payo®s of the game. The common market is established if fJoin, Joing is a
Nash equilibrium for this game.
4 Status quo policies
The set of non-discriminatory policies prevailing in each country under the status quo is
determined by maximizing the median voter's welfare.26 The separability of the production
function implies that the demand of each factor j in country z will only depend on its own
price !z
j. Focusing for tractability upon the case where rent capturing is complete27 (i.e.
°j = 1 for all j), when an interior solution exists,28 the factor price that maximizes the












j = 0 (3)
is not implemented, while in general they will be di®erent from the status quo if the two countries form the
common market. Note also that by assuming that the optimal restriction/subsidy maximizes the welfare of
the majority of the natives, we are ruling out the possibility that the owners of the relocating factor can
in°uence the optimal policy in the destination country. This appears to be a natural assumption, at least if
we are considering a short term political economy perspective.
25Since preferences are single peaked on each single dimension, the policy preferred by the median voter
on each factor price is a Condorcet winner.
26Mayer (1984) was the ¯rst to characterize the policy chosen by the median voter in a speci¯c factor
model similar to ours.
27We will analyze in detail the case of imperfect rent capturing in section 7.4.
28This requires uz
i(!z) to be concave in prices. This assumption is satis¯ed for instance whenever factor
demands are linear, i.e. if Lz
j(!j) = L¡b!z





























































j from which equation 4 follows
immediately.
10Therefore, citizen's i most preferred factor return is given by:
!
z









j , i.e. the derivative of the factor import demand, is negative. As a result,
agents characterized by an ownership share of the factor ¸z
ij > 1, prefer the introduction of
protection (i.e. !z
j > 1), while the opposite is true for agents characterized by less than the
average ownership share (¸z
ij < 1). Let ¸z
mj be country z's median voter ownership share of
factor j. Then, the status quo factor return ^ !z












Notice that the policy towards in°ows of factor j takes the form of a restriction (this could
be a tax or a quota with perfect rent capturing) if the median voter's ownership share
is higher than the population's average (¸z
mj > 1), while it is a subsidy if it is below the
population average. Thus, for example FDI subsidies should be observed if capital ownership
is concentrated and similarly this is the case for an education requirement for immigrants
when human capital is concentrated.30 Furthermore, the ¯rst order condition of equation 5
tells us that the extent of policy intervention is increasing with the domestic factor supply,
and is decreasing with the price sensitivity of import demand.
5 The economic consequences of a common market
Before we discuss the conditions under which a common market will emerge in equilibrium,
it is worth analyzing the welfare implications, for each domestic factor, of the decision of a
country to join it. When a common market is formed, it is no longer true that the two mobile
factors will receive their rewards in the country of origin, since in the absence of barriers,
the existing price di®erentials may lead to the relocation of capital and labor between the
member countries. As a consequence, the factor income can be earned in any of the two
30Notice that a similar pattern of protection emerges in a Ricardo-Viner model of international trade,
in which trade policies are determined by the median voter. While our result is plausible in the case of
international factor movements, i.e. capital ownership is concentrated and most countries have subsidies
in place to attract FDI, the same is not true when we think of a trade model. In fact, sectors in which
capital ownership is more concentrated are those which tend to receive higher protection. For a discussion
see Helpman (1997). We would like to thank a referee for pointing this out.
11countries, while returns on the immobile factor and ¯scal transfers are still determined in
the country of origin. Let ~ !z
j and ~ !z0
j be the return earned by factor j in country z and z0
respectively, where z;z0 2 fH;Fg, when the common market is formed. Then the welfare of


























j) + ¼(~ !
z) (6)
where Iz = 1 if the factor earns its return in z, and zero otherwise.
We use Figure 2 to depict the market for input j from the point of view of the Home
country (left panel), while in the right panel we depict the same factor's market from the
point of view of the Foreign country. The analysis of the market for factor j0 is analogous.
We start our discussion describing the possible equilibria that can arise, beginning with the
point of view of Home, and consider next the corresponding equilibrium outcomes in Foreign.
To keep the analysis tractable, in the remainder of the paper we limit our attention to the
case in which the demand for each mobile production factor is linear, i.e.31
L
zD















The downward sloping line in the left panel of Figure 2 depicts Home's import demand




j , while the three vertical lines labeled (1), (2)
and (3) indicate three di®erent original endowments of the factor in Foreign. In what follows
we will assume, for simplicity, that in the status quo both Home and Foreign are importing
factor j, and that in both Home and Foreign the median voter opts for a restriction in the
imports of factor j (i.e. ¸z
mj > 1). Furthermore, without loss of generality, we will focus
on the situation in which Home's status quo non-discriminatory policy is more restrictive
than Foreign's, so that ^ !H
j > ^ !F
j . Finally, our analysis will focus on the short run, and as a
result we assume that an individual born in country z will always vote and thus a®ect policy

















a more general production structure, like one inducing a constant elasticity factor demand function would
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Figure 2: Factor return in a common market
outcomes in his/her country of birth.32
The three di®erent combinations of factor endowments allow us to highlight the welfare
e®ects of the creation of a common market.33 One of the most important consequences of the
free mobility of factors is the potential change in the factor income in the destination country.
Let `H
j + `F
j = ` for j = fK;Lg be the total supply of factor j in the common market. As
long as there is a positive price di®erential between Home and Foreign, the Foreign's factor
will have an incentive to relocate to Home. For our later discussion it is useful to introduce
the price !H¤
j such that LHD
j = `. It is easy to show that !H¤
j = L¡`
b . Clearly, whenever
!H¤
j ¸ ^ !H





b , the factor movement does not trigger a decrease of
the price prevailing in Home, while the opposite holds when L¡`











32Of course, enfranchising or not immigrants is per se a policy decision. In general, as it has been
extensively documented by Bertocchi and Strozzi (2004), the acquisition of voting rights in the destination
country involves complex procedures even in traditionally open countries like the United States. In Germany,
until the recent reform of the citizenship law approved in 1999, even the descendants of immigrants were not
admitted to citizenship and thus did not enjoy the right to vote.
33The discussion carried out here is similar in spirit to Richardson (1992) and Grossman and Helpman
(1995), with the main di®erence being that ex post policies vis{µ a{vis the rest of the world are endogenously
determined in our model, while there they are taken as exogenously given.
13In this case, Foreign's supply of the factor is limited and, at the status quo price ^ !H
j , it is
not su±cient to satisfy Home's import demand. A \rule of origin" provision will ensure that
Home will continue to satisfy its residual demand by directly importing from the Rest of
the World. The initial policy chosen by the median does not change and continues to be
binding. Thus, the politically determined return to factor j in Home is the same as under
the status quo, i.e. ~ !H
j = ^ !H
j .34 On the other hand, Home's ¯scal revenues are reduced by









This e®ect corresponds to what is known as \trade diversion" in the Vinerian theory of
preferential trading arrangements.
Turning to Foreign, as a result of the common market formation, the country now expe-
riences an out°ow of the factor to Home, and satis¯es its demand importing from the Rest
of the World. Note that since the entire Foreign's supply of factor j has moved to Home,
Foreign's median voter will now obtain factor j's income in Home, while ¯scal transfers and




























The complete relocation of Foreign's supply of factor j to Home implies that the ex{post
policy chosen in Foreign vis{µ a{vis imports of factor j from the rest of the world changes







j ¡ 1)b = 0 (11)
and thus we have that
~ !
F
j = 1 (12)
i.e. free factor mobility prevails. The corresponding revenue loss in Foreign as a result of
the formation of the common market amounts to
¢T
F







34The policy vis{µ a{vis the rest of the world continues to be determined by Home's median voter.
14Foreign's citizens will be instead able to grab the bene¯ts of the higher return to the factor
j realized when it moves to Home:
¢W
F
j = (^ !
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To summarize, in case (1), the return to factor j for both Home and Foreign individual
suppliers as well as pro¯ts do not decline (some factors actually strictly gain). For this reason
we will say that the introduction of a common market results in enhanced protection for the
factors.35
At the opposite end of the spectrum of possible outcomes, we have the situation in which
Foreign's factor supply is very large (case (3) in Figure 2), and is more than su±cient to
satisfy Home's import demand at the lowest status quo price ^ !F
j . In other words, !H¤
j · ^ !F
j ,
or L¡`




b . Also in this case, Foreign's factor will move to Home in order
to take advantage of the initially higher return. However, the supply is so large that the
in°ow will lead to a decrease in the factor return in Home until factor prices are equalized,
i.e. ~ !H
j = ^ !F
j .
We can label this as the reduced protection case, i.e. the situation in which in Home the
factor return declines compared to the status quo as the result of the creation of a Common
Market. The income loss for Home's factor owners will be
¢W
H
j = ¡(^ !
H





and Home's residents will see their position worsened also through a reduction in the ¯scal
revenues, since now factor j is no longer imported from the Rest of the World. The loss
occurring to Home's government budget is
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H







Notice that, at the same time, pro¯ts are naturally going to rise as a result of the decline in
factor prices.
From the point of view of Foreign, only part of the total mobile factor supply has moved
to Home, and in particular the factor supply of the median voter has not relocated. In fact,
35This concept has been originally introduced by Krueger (1999) while analyzing the e®ects of a preferential
trading arrangement.
15as we can see from the left panel of Figure 2, if the entire Foreign factor supply were to
move to Home, the equilibrium price prevailing in Home's market would be lower than the
status quo price obtained in Foreign. As a consequence, the median voter faced with the
option to relocate the factor to Home and obtain a lower return than by maintaining it in
Foreign, will clearly prefer not to change its location. Therefore, the factor income earned by
Foreign's median voter in Foreign does not change in equilibrium, and similarly the pro¯ts











since Home will now employ mH
j (^ !F
j ) units of factor j originating in Foreign, this factor
supply will be replaced in Foreign by in°ows from the Rest of the World. To summarize, in
case (3) the return to Home's factor and the ¯scal revenues will decline if a common market
is formed, while pro¯ts increase. At the same time, in Foreign the return to the factor will
not be a®ected and the same will be true for pro¯ts, while the government's revenues will
increase due to the larger in°ow of (taxed) factor from the rest of the world.
The last possibility, described in Figure 2 as case (2) arises when Foreign's factor supply is
in an intermediate position, so that it is large enough to satisfy Home's import demand at the
status quo price ^ !H
j , but it is not large enough to reduce the price prevailing in Home to ^ !F
j .
In other words, the equilibrium price prevailing in Home if the common market is formed is
~ !H
j , where ^ !F
j < ~ !H
j < ^ !H










Foreign's factor will once again take advantage of the higher return prevailing in Home and
move there. Clearly, if ^ !F
j < ~ !H
j ; the positive price di®erential implies that Foreign's entire
factor supply has relocated to Home. Therefore, as in case 1, Foreign's median voter will
choose to impose no restriction on the imports of factor j from the Rest of the World, i.e.
~ !F
j = 1.
The welfare implications in this case are particularly interesting. From Home's residents'
point of view, the country experiences a welfare reduction through a decline in factor income
and a decline in ¯scal revenues, while through the pro¯t channel there is a welfare improve-
ment. More precisely, since ^ !H
j > ~ !H
j , with the introduction of the Common Market the
domestic factor reward declines by the following amount:
¢W
H
j = ¡(^ !
H




j < 0 (18)
16Table 1: Creating a common market
Case (1) Case (2) Case (3)
Return to factor j in Foreign # # Unchanged
Return to factor j in Home Unchanged # #
The same is true for ¯scal revenues that will shrink by:
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H







as imports from the Rest of the World are completely replaced by imports from Foreign.
The pro¯ts will instead increase due to the decline in the mobile factor reward.
In Foreign's case the situation can be described as follows. Foreign's factor experiences
an increase in its compensation when it moves to Home:
¢W
F
j = (~ !
H





while Foreign's government revenues are entirely lost, i.e there is a decline
¢T
F







in ¯scal revenues. The pro¯ts on the other hand increase since the mobile factor's return
prevailing in Foreign has declined as a result of the country's membership in the Common
Market.
The analysis developed so far has identi¯ed the incentives behind the creation of a com-
mon market, and in so doing has allowed us to lay out the foundations for the characterization
of the voting equilibrium, which will be developed in the next section. Before considering
these policies, notice a few common elements that emerge from our discussion. If a common
market is created, the wage earned abroad by a factor that is exported from one country
to its partner will never be lower than the one it was earning in the status quo. At the
same time, the return on a factor that is imported from a partner country as a result of the
creation of a Common Market will never increase compared to the status quo. Finally, the
17relocation of a factor from one country to the other in the presence of a Common Market
might induce changes in the optimal policy chosen in the factor's country of origin. The
e®ects of the creation of a common market between Home and Foreign on the return to
factor j is illustrated in Table 1.36 The main message of our discussion is that the factor
return prevailing in each country cannot rise as a result of the formation of the Common
Market. Consequently, the return earned by the ¯xed factor (i.e. the pro¯ts) will increase.
Once we take into account the ¯scal transfers to the agents, the position of the median voter
becomes more complex, as we will see in the next section.
6 The common market game
When choosing whether to form or not a Common Market, Home and Foreign hold a ref-
erendum whereby they decide whether to remove barriers to factor movements between the
two countries or to keep the status quo policies that we have described in section 4. Given
the outcome of the referendum, the government will then adjust the restrictions/subsidies
towards the rest of the world in order to maximize the welfare of the native median voter as
discussed in section 5.37 Hence, the native median voters of the two countries decide simul-
taneously and non-cooperatively whether to support or not the common market initiative,38
given the optimal set of restrictions/subsidies toward the Rest of the World. Remembering
that the strategies of the median voters are fJoin, Stay Outg, we know that a common
market will be established only if fJoin, Joing is a Nash equilibrium for this game.
For simplicity, we will assume that the median voter's ownership share of every factor
is ¸m, so that for all j 2 fK;Lg and z 2 fH;Fg, ¸z
mj = ¸m.39 Furthermore, there exists
a median agent i such that ¸z
ij = ¸m > 1 for all j and z.40 The driving force behind the
model are di®erences in factor endowments. Denoting by µz
j the share of factor j in country
36The argument for the other factor is analogous.
37Notice that in this setting, we are not considering explicit redistribution between member countries,
which could be used to alter the incentives of the median voter in favor of the creation of the common
market. This seems realistic since in the EU, only 0.1 % of the total GDP of the area is used for this
purpose, and even with the recent enlargement, it is very hard to con¯gure a much bigger role for this type
of expenditures.
38In choosing the non-cooperative approach, we follow the existing literature on PTA formation. See
among others Grossman and Helpman (1995), Levy (1997) and Cadot, de Melo, and Olarreaga (1999).
39We will relax this assumption in section 7.
40In other words, we focus on the situation in which factor °ows are restricted. The analysis of a more
general set of policies is carried out in the next section.
18z, we assume that Home is capital abundant, i.e. that it is endowed with a fraction µH
K > 1
2
of ` = `H
K + `F
K, while Foreign is assumed to be labor abundant, i.e. it is endowed with
a fraction µF
L > 1
2 of ` = `H
L + `F
L. For simplicity we will consider ¯rst the case in which
µH
K = µF
L = µ > 1
2, and generalize our analysis in section 7.
We are now ready to evaluate the e®ects of the creation of a common market on the
median voter's welfare in the three cases outlined in the previous section. Before discussing
each of the three possible scenarios, remembering that ¼(!) =
P
j ¼j(!j), where j 2 fK;Lg41
we prove the following lemma, which turns out to be useful in characterizing the solution to
our problem:



















j · 0 8!z
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j · 0 8!z
j ¸ 1 and 8`z
j ¸ 0 . ¤
Intuitively, Lemma 1 says that, starting from a situation of protection (i.e. !z
j > 1), should
the factor price !z
j decrease, the (eventual) ¯scal revenue loss for factor j is more than
compensated by the pro¯t gain.
Using Lemma 1, we can evaluate the e®ect of the common market initiative on the `other





for each factor j. Consider the case in which factor j is relatively
abundant in Home. From our discussion in section 5, we know that in the presence of a
common market, the equilibrium factor return prevailing at Home, ~ !z
j, cannot be higher than







j, we can immediately conclude that the formation of the common market leads to an
increase of the other source of income for factor j at Home. As for factor j0 2 fK;Lg the
symmetry of our setup implies that this is Home's less abundant factor which is exported
to Foreign. Therefore, to establish the e®ect of the common market initiative, we need to
distinguish the case where the factor supply of the median voter relocates to the partner
country from the case where it remains in its country of origin. Starting from the case where
the factor supply of the median voter does not relocate, the price of the scarce factor in the
country of origin does not change (case 3 in our discussion in section 5), which implies that
¼j0 will also not be a®ected. However, since part of the scarce factor has relocated to the
partner country, Home's imports from the ROW need to increase, leading to an increase in
41See the derivation of the pro¯t function in footnote 31.
19tari® revenues. Hence, given that ¼j0 remains unchanged, while tari® revenues increase, we
can conclude that when the factor supply of the median voter does not relocate, the 'other
source' of income increases. On the other hand, if the factor supply of the median voter
relocates (case 2 in section 5) the return to the less abundant factor in Home converges to
the international price, i.e. !z
j = 1. Note that, when !z
j = 1, the other source of income for










for any given level of `z
j. In particular, this is true in the common market scenario we
are considering, where the scarce factor entirely relocates to the partner country and hence
`z
j = 0.
To sum up, from the above discussion, we can conclude that the variation in the `other
source of income' Rj(!z
j) works in favor of the common market initiative for both factors
in all the scenarios we considered, while this is not generally true for the variation of factor
returns, since we know that the equilibrium price of some factor can be lower in the common
market than in the status quo. In fact, in the scenario labeled as increased protection, the
total factor income works in the same direction as the `other source of income' since they
both increase as compared to the status quo when the common market is formed. On the
other hand, in the other two scenarios (decreased protection and intermediate case) the
decrease of the equilibrium price of some factors may have an adverse e®ect on the common
market initiative.
Some additional simplifying notation will be useful to formally lay out our main results
in the three di®erent cases. Let ´ (respectively ´) be the amount of protection enjoyed by
the more (less) abundant factor in each country before the integration takes place, where
´ = (¸m ¡ 1)µ `
b and ´= (¸m ¡ 1)(1 ¡ µ) `
b with µ > 1
2. The following proposition summarizes
the outcome of the common market game under enhanced protection (case 1) and reduced
protection (case 3) :
Proposition 1 If L¡`
b ¸ 1 + ´ , then the common market is formed. On the other hand, if
L¡`
b · 1+´ then the common market is not formed.
Proof. Let ~ Uz
m be the indirect utility of the median voter in country z when the common
market is formed. Furthermore, let ^ Uz
m be his indirect utility in the status quo and let
¢Uz
m = (~ Uz
m ¡ ^ Uz
m). First note that for fJoin;Joing to be a Nash equilibrium, ¢Uz
m must
be strictly positive for both countries. If L¡`
b ¸ 1 + ´, we are in the enhanced protection
situation (case 1) discussed in section 5 and since both the total factor income and the other
20source of income are higher under the common market than under the status quo then clearly
¢Uz
m > 0. When L¡`
b · 1+´, then we are in the decreased protection situation described as
case (3) and ¢Uz













Knowing that b !z
j = 1+(¸m ¡1)µ`
b and e !z
j = 1+(¸m ¡1)
(1¡µ)`
b where µ > 1
2, then, ¢Uz
m can
be rewritten as ¢Uz
m = ¸(1
2 ¡ µ) + (µ ¡ 1
2) < 0 8¸ ¸ 1. Hence, since ¢Uz
m < 0, we conclude
that under decreased protection the common market cannot arise as a Nash equilibrium. ¤
Intuitively, the proposition shows that the change in the equilibrium price of the two
factors has a crucial e®ect on the common market initiative. In the decreased protection
scenario, the loss from the mobile factors' return outweighs the gains from other sources of
income thus preventing the formation of the common market. On the other hand, under
enhanced protection, when the total mobile factor income increases, the median voter does
not have any reason to oppose the formation of the common market, since he actually
strictly gains from it. More generally, given that the common market initiative has always a
positive impact on the other source of income, when the total mobile factor income increases,
the median voter will certainly support the initiative. Hence, even in the intermediate case,
where the return on the abundant factor decreases and the one on the scarce factor increases,
whenever the gain on one factor compensates the loss on the other, the common market will
be formed. More formally, for the intermediate situation discussed under case 2, assuming
that j is the scarce factor so that that ~ !j denotes the return fetched by the exported factor
j in the destination country when a Common Market is formed, we can show the following
result:
Proposition 2 Suppose that 1 + ´ > L¡`
b > 1 + ´. If ~ !j > 1 + µ´ + (1 ¡ µ)´, then the
common market is formed
Proof. If 1 + ´ > L¡`
b > 1 + ´ , the total mobile factor income variation from joining the


















m > 0 whenever L¡`
b > 1 + µ´ + (1 ¡ µ)´, then the result follows from proposition
1. ¤
Intuitively, the proposition says that if the return to the mobile factor exported to the
partner country is su±ciently high as to compensate the decrease in the return of the mobile
21factor, which is not exported, then the median voter is willing to support the common
market. The term µ´ + (1 ¡ µ)´ is a weighted average of the protection previously enjoyed
by the two factors in country z (with weights equivalent to the relative shares of the factors)
and it measures the increase above the international price that will be su±cient to induce
the median voter to support the integration process.42 In other words, if the exported
factor enjoys an increased protection equal to the weighted average of the protection levels
previously enjoyed by the two mobile factors, then the common market will be supported by
the median voter.43
7 Extensions
So far we have assumed some basic symmetry between Home and Foreign. In particular, in
our discussion the median voter in both countries owns the same, greater than average, share
of each factor. Furthermore, while Home is capital abundant and Foreign is labor abundant,
the two countries are mirror images of each other (i.e. µH
K = µF
L = µ). To make our analysis
more realistic, we will relax one at the time these assumptions in what follows. We start
by considering a situation in which, given the same distribution of factor ownership across
countries, the median voter has a below{average ownership share of capital, while he owns an
above average share of labor. Next, to study the e®ects of a perspective member's economic
size, we will allow countries to be endowed with di®erent factor's shares (µH
K 6= µF
L). Third,
we will show how the distribution of factor ownership matters in shaping the incentives
for the creation of a common market. Finally, in our last extension, we will consider the
consequences of explicitly introducing partial rent capturing in the model, which could arise
for example because a quota is used to limit immigration °ows which is accompanied by a
tax generating a di®erential ¯scal treatment for immigrants.




j + ¼(1) ¸ ^ Uz





b > 0; where ^ Uz
m denotes the utility obtained by the median voter in
the status quo. Note that, although algebraically more complex, the necessary and su±cient condition also
requires the equilibrium price of the scarce factor to be above the international price, where the increase
above the international price, given by the term Á, is positively related to the status quo utility, and therefore
to the level of protection previously enjoyed by both factors.
43If we remove the simplifying assumption on the symmetry of total endowments, i.e. we let `K 6= `L, the























j0 for j;j0 2 fK;Lg.
227.1 Concentrated capital ownership
The ownership of assets in an economy is typically highly concentrated and thus our original
assumption that the median voter owns more capital than the population average is likely
to be violated in reality. For this reason it is important to study how the formation of a
common market is a®ected if we assume that ¸mK < 1, while the median voter's labor share
continues to be ¸mL > 1. In these circumstances the optimal status quo policy in each
country is a subsidy on capital and a tari® on labor. From equation 8 we know that the
subsidy/tari® is higher in the country that is relatively more abundant in each factor. Hence,
having assumed that Home is capital abundant and Foreign is labor abundant, then both
the subsidized price of capital and the protected price of labor are higher in Foreign than in
Home. As a consequence, if the two countries form a common market, both labor and capital
will relocate from Home to Foreign to take advantage of potentially higher factor returns.
Thus, from the point of view of the median voter in Foreign, the creation of a common market
clearly has a detrimental e®ect on both his factor returns, and from the characterization of
the median voter optimal choice under decreased protection we can establish the following
result:
Proposition 3 Suppose that ¸mK < 1 and ¸mL > 1 and assume that Home is capital
abundant while Foreign is labor abundant. Under this scenario the common market is not
formed.
Hence, a concentrated distribution of capital works against the formation of a common
market. Interestingly, proposition 3 tells us that the opposition to the common market
comes from the country that is relatively less abundant in capital because, when the barriers
between the two member states are removed, the country with a relatively lower capital
endowment becomes an importer of both factors.
7.2 Asymmetric country size
So far in our discussion we have assumed that the two countries are mirror images of each
other. Of course, economies can vary substantially in their size, and it is important to study
how this can impact the likelihood of the formation of a common market, keeping our other
hypotheses unchanged. In our model, if µH
K 6= µF
L, in the status quo Home's and Foreign's
factors will be subject to di®erent levels of protection, and as a result, to carry out our
23analysis, we need to consider two asymmetric scenarios, where the intermediate situation
(case 2), arising for one factor, is combined with either enhanced protection (case 1) or
decreased protection (case 3) for the other.44
To consider these possibilities, we need to introduce some additional notation. Let z be
the country abundant in factor j (µz
j > 1





j0. Under the status quo factor j gets protection ´z
j in country z and
´z0
j in country z0, with ´z
j >´z0
j . Similarly, factor j0 obtains protection ´z0
j0 in z0 and protection
´z
j0 in z, where ´z0
j0 > ´z
j0 .
We assume that factor j0 is in the intermediate situation (case 2) and that factor j either














> 1 + ´
z
j0 (23)
The right hand side of the ¯rst inequality (i.e. L¡`
b ¸ 1 + ´z
j) represents the scenario where
factor j experiences enhanced protection (case 1) and the left hand side (i.e. 1 + ´z0
j0 > L¡`
b )
illustrates the case where j0 is the intermediate situation of case 2. Similarly, the left hand
part of the second inequality (1 + ´z0
j ¸ L¡`
b ) represents the scenario where factor j obtains
decreased protection (case 3), while the right hand side (L¡`
b > 1 + ´z
j0) corresponds to the
intermediate scenario for factor j0 (case 2). Considering these alternative scenarios, we can
prove the following result:
Proposition 4 Suppose that 1 + ´z0
j0 > L¡`
b ¸ 1 + ´z
j: In this case the common market is













then the common market is not formed.
Proof. The parameter restriction L¡`
b ¸ 1 + ´z
j implies that the common market price for
factor j in country z is ~ !j = 1 + ´z
j. For factor j0, given that 1 + ´z0
j0 > L¡`
b ; we know that
the common market price in country z0 is ~ !z0
j0 = L¡`
b > (1 + ´z
j0). The total variation in the








j0)] > 0. The




44Note that the combination of case 1 and case 3 cannot arise because enhanced protection for factor j
(i.e. L¡`
b > 1 + ´z
j) and decreased protection for factor j0 (i.e. 1 + ´z
j0 > L¡`
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j ); given that ¢Ez
m > 0 and ¢Ez0
m > 0, the common market




voter's j factor supply does not relocate from country z0 to country z. As a consequence,
his income deriving from the exported factor does not change, while the return he receives
on the imported factor decreases. Hence, from proposition 1 we know that ¢Uz
m < 0, which
implies that the common market is not a Nash equilibrium. ¤
Note that the ¯rst part of the proposition combines the enhanced protection and the
intermediate situation. Therefore, compared to proposition 1 (where both factors experience
enhanced protection) clearly the Common Market formation is here less likely. The opposite
holds if we compare this result with proposition 2, since the threshold level for ~ !z0
j0 in 2
is higher than in proposition 4. Finally, with asymmetric country sizes it might turn out
that one country only is unambiguously hurt by decreased protection. In this case, as the
second part of the last proposition shows, the common market will of course not be formed.
Hence, overall we ¯nd that in two scenarios out of three, the introduction of asymmetric
endowments makes the integration process more di±cult.
7.3 Heterogenous median voters
Up to now, we have assumed that the median voter in Home and Foreign are identical, i.e.
they own the same share of the two factors. Of course, it is very likely that a substantial
degree of heterogeneity exists in the cross{country distributions of factor ownership, so that
the median voters may be di®erent both across factors and countries. In what follows we
generalize the results of propositions 1-4 allowing the median voter's ownership share to vary
across countries and factors, while retaining all the other assumptions of our original model.
Remembering that the optimal amount of protection depends on the median voter's share of







b be the protection enjoyed by the relatively more abundant









b be the protection enjoyed by the less abundant factor j, where we
assume that ´z
j0 > ´z
j. We can then prove the following result:
Proposition 5 Given any share ¸z
mj;¸z
mj0 > 1, if L¡`
b ¸ 1 + ´z
j0, then the common market
is formed, while if L¡`
b · 1 + ´z


















b ¸ 1 + ´z
j0 or L¡`
b · 1 + ´z
j the proposition is merely a restatement of
proposition 1 assuming that the degree of protection varies with the ownership share. When
1 + ´z
j0 > L¡`
b > 1 + ´z
j, the change in factor income for the median voter in country z is
¢Ez
m = [(1 ¡ µ)¸z
mj + µ¸z
mj0]L¡`
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j, then the result follows
from proposition 2. ¤
The most interesting e®ect of heterogeneity in the median voter's share arises in the
intermediate case where again we can see that if the exported factor enjoys a protection
equal to a \weighted average" of pre-common market protection levels, where the weights
are given by the median voter's relative ownership shares of the two factors, then the median
voter supports the common market. Note that the degree of enhanced protection sustaining
the Common Market initiative is higher, the bigger is the median voter's ownership share
of the factor that does not relocate. Therefore, the (positive) implication of proposition 5 is
that the integration process is more likely to be successful when the median ownership share
of the factor that is not exported is not too di®erent from the average. Moreover, from a
normative perspective, this will also make the Common Market less distortive.
What have we learned? First of all, for factor market integration to be sustained as a
political equilibrium, the median voter should gain from the resulting factor °ows between
the two countries. Di®erences in initial returns imply that the removal of obstacles to factor
mobility might lead to gains for those factors that actually end up relocating between the
member countries. At the same time, factors which do not move might su®er a decline
in their return as a result of the integration process. Gains from factor mobility are more
likely to occur the bigger is the import demand of the destination country compared to the
factor supply of the country of origin. Indeed, as we have seen in section 5, under enhanced
protection when the factor supply of the `source' partner country is not su±cient to satisfy
the entire import demand of the receiving country, not only will the median voter of the
exporting country grab substantial gains, but also no losses will harm the median voter of
the importing country. On the other hand, when reductions in factor returns as a result of
market integration cannot be avoided, then for a Common Market to arise, it is crucial that
the median voter's bene¯t from the relocation of one factor is su±ciently large to compensate
26the loss on the factor that has not relocated (case 2). Certainly, the Common Market is not
politically feasible when factors' movements are so big that price di®erentials would disappear
and the median voters experience an income loss from the factor in°ow and no gain from the
factor out°ow (case 3). In other words, a large factor in°ow triggering a dramatic decrease
in factor returns in one country would be su±cient to prevent the formation of the Common
Market. Besides factor °ows' size, import demand elasticities also play an important role,
since a rigid import demand will { ceteris paribus { lead to a sharp decrease in factor returns,
and this will work against the integration process.
Furthermore, since for the integration process to move forward both countries need to
support the initiative, a common market will not be formed under any asymmetric scenario
in which the median voter of just one country su®ers this type of loss. This situation can
occur either when countries di®er in size (proposition 4) or if a member becomes an importer
of both factors when the common market is formed (proposition 3). Finally, the distribution
of factors' ownership in the population is also important. In general, the median voter is
more likely to support the common market, the bigger is his share of the relocating factor.
At the same time, when the median voter's share of the non relocating factor is closer to the
average, the chances of successful integration are higher (proposition 5).
An important lesson to be learned from our analysis is therefore that some factors must
experience enhanced protection as a result of the formation of the Common Market, for the
entity to emerge as a political equilibrium. In other words, by relocating to the partner
country, the moving factor must enjoy a positive policy spillover in the form of a higher
protection (return) that could not be sustained as a political equilibrium if the country
of origin were not to join the integration process. Furthermore, the return required to
sustain the common market is higher, the bigger the ownership share of the median voter
as compared to the rest of the population, and the higher is his relative share in the factor
that is not exported. From the point of view of society as a whole, this might well be a
troublesome conclusion. The political process is indeed telling us that economic integration
is more likely to move forward, the more distortive are its e®ects. This conclusion should
not be too surprising though, since the median voter and the average citizen's interests are
not fully aligned in this model.
277.4 Quotas and imperfect rent capturing
Restrictions to the physical relocation of people across countries often take the form of a
(binding) quota, accompanied by a tax (i.e. a di®erential ¯scal treatment for immigrants),45
resulting in the immigrant retaining part of the surplus associated to the relocation (i.e.
the di®erence between the wage prevailing in the country of destination and the country
of origin). It is thus interesting to explore the e®ects of imperfect rent capturing on the
formation of the common market, while retaining all other assumptions of our original model.
As we have seen in section 3, in the presence of imperfect rent capturing, citizens i's utility























which is a well behaved function under the restriction 1=2 < °j < 1, that we assume to hold
throughout the analysis.46 To keep the discussion simple, we will assume also in this section
that the median voter's ownership share of each factor is the same across countries, so that
¸z
mj = ¸m > 1, while we allow for asymmetric factor endowments. When an import quota
is the instrument chosen and rent capturing is not perfect, the status quo policy chosen by
the native median voter of country z is given by:
!
z








(L ¡ b) (25)
A protectionist policy will be in place (i.e. !z
j > 1), if and only if the the median voter
owns a share ¸m such that:





Hence, protection is chosen when the median voter's ownership share of the factor is bigger
than the threshold level ¸
z
j = °j + (1 ¡ °j)
(L¡b)
`z
j > 1.47 In other words, if capturing of
the rent by the government is imperfect, protection is less likely to emerge in equilibrium,
45See Timmer and Williamson (1996) for an interesting historical account.
46Note that when °j = 1 the subutility uij(!j) is strictly concave and this property is preserved for any
1=2 < °j < 1. Since each subutility is single-picked, the median voter result can be applied, i.e. the policy
preferred by the median voter is a Condorcet winner.
47The only policy instrument available is a quota cum tax and no negative protection can be chosen in
this case. Hence, when the ¯rst order condition would give !z














Figure 3: Protection with imperfect rent capturing





b(1¡2°j)(L¡b) be the level of protection granted to factor j in country z before the integration









The following lemma allow us to compare the level of protection chosen under perfect and
imperfect rent capturing:
Lemma 2 Suppose that ¸m > ¸
z
j. Then, ´j(1) ¸ ´j(°j) if and only if ¸
z
j < ¸m · ¸¤z
j .
Proof. Since ´j(1) = (¸m¡1)
`z
j





b(1¡2°j)(L¡b), then ´j(1) ¸ ´j(°j)





Intuitively, under perfect rent capturing, for a given level of imports, an increase in the
tax revenue from protection completely o®sets the pro¯t loss, while this is no longer true
under imperfect rent capturing. Hence, in the latter case protection becomes less desirable
unless the gain from factor income is su±ciently high to more than compensate the loss in
¯scal revenues associated with imperfect capturing (i.e. ¸m > ¸¤z
j ). The result is illustrated
in ¯gure 3.
Having discussed the median voter's optimal level of protection under both perfect and
imperfect rent capturing, we are now ready to consider how the use of di®erent policy
instruments a®ects the likelihood of the formation of a common market. To do so, we
will study under which policy tool the conditions highlighted in proposition 1 and 2 are
29more likely to be satis¯ed.48 Some interesting results emerge, which are summarized in the
following
Proposition 6 If ¸
z
j < ¸m · ¸¤z
j the formation of a common market is more likely under
a quota cum tax than under an in°ow tax with perfect rent capturing. On the other hand,
if ¸m > ¸¤z
j , the use of a quota cum tax renders the formation of the common market less
likely.
Proof. Suppose that ¸
z
j < ¸m · ¸¤z
j : From lemma 2 it follows that ´j(1) > ´j(°j) for all
°j 6= 1. From proposition 1 we know that if L¡`
b ¸ 1 + ´j(1) ¸ 1 + ´j(°j) then the common
market is formed for all °j. On the other hand, if 1 + ´j(1) > L¡`
b ¸ 1 + ´j(°j) with °j 6= 1,
the common market is always formed for all °j 6= 1 but is not necessarily formed for °j = 1:
Similarly, when L¡`
b · 1 + ´
j(°j) · 1 + ´




j(1) with °j 6= 1, the common market is not formed for
°j = 1 but it can be formed for °j 6= 1. Consider now the results discussed in proposition 2.
From lemma 2 we know that 1+´j (1) ¸ 1+´j (°j) > L¡`
b > 1+´
j (1) ¸ 1+´
j (°). Hence, if
~ !j > 1+µ´j (1)+(1 ¡ µ)´
j (1) ¸ 1+µ´j(°j)+(1¡µ)´
j(°j) then the common market is formed
for all °j. On the other hand, if 1+µ´j (1)+(1 ¡ µ)´
j (1) > e !j > 1+µ´j(°j)+(1¡µ)´
j(°j),
with °j 6= 1 then the common market is only formed for °j 6= 1. Hence we can conclude that
whenever the common market is formed for °j 6= 1, it is not necessarily formed for °j = 1;
while the reverse is not true. Consider now the case where ¸m > ¸¤z
j . Since ¸m > ¸¤z
j implies
´j (1) < ´j(°j) and ´
j(1) < ´
j(°j), by symmetry we obtain that the common market is more
likely to be formed under perfect rent capturing. ¤
Hence, for intermediate levels of ¸m (i.e. ¸
z
j < ¸m < ¸¤z
j ), imperfect rent capturing,
by reducing the rent obtained by the native median voter, makes the status quo optimal
immigration policy less restrictive. As a consequence, the opportunity cost of giving up
protection decreases and therefore the formation of the common market becomes more likely.
On the other hand, for more extreme values of ¸m (i.e. ¸m > ¸¤z
j ), imperfect rent capturing
makes protection more desirable, thereby lowering the likelihood that the common market
is formed.
48The analysis for the asymmetric case considered in proposition 4 is analogous.
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This paper develops a theory of the endogenous formation of a common market. The institu-
tional setting is a direct democracy, and the driving force behind the results is the di®erence
in factor endowments between the potential partner countries.
In our the three{country setting the ¯rst best policy is free factor mobility at the world{
wide level. At the same time, compared to the status quo, the creation of a common market
is always welfare enhancing. In fact, as we have shown, factor prices will never increase as
a result of the bilateral liberalization and thus, the well-being of the average citizen can
only (weakly) increase if the common market comes about. However, in the presence of
heterogenous agents, a common market will bring about winners and losers. As a result, a
welfare enhancing bilateral liberalization might well turn out to be not politically feasible.
Although the analysis of the policy instruments that may help to overcome this obstacle
goes beyond the scope of this paper, we can think of at least two instruments that might
be available to the governments of the perspective member countries. On the one hand,
ex{ante transfers across countries could be used to reduce the asymmetries that prevent the
formation of the common market. On the other, ex{post transfers within countries from
those who gain from the integration to those who lose could be implemented.49
While we leave an empirical evaluation of the model for further research, we believe
that this framework is capable to rationalize some of the recent developments in the EU
enlargement process. Consider, for instance, the case of Switzerland, a natural candidate
to membership in the western European club. In March 2001 Swiss voters overwhelmingly
rejected a proposal aimed at the immediate start of accession negotiations, and the existing
bilateral agreements with the EU on labor movement are also inspired by extreme caution.50
The model developed in this paper helps explaining this outcome. Switzerland is a small
country, with a highly skilled labor force, very low unemployment rates (1.9 % in 2001) and
very high GDP per capita, even by Western European standards.51 If the country were to
join the EU, it is reasonable to expect a substantial in°ow of foreign labor, at all skill levels,
with the likely outcome being \reduced protection", given the substantial di®erence in size
and unemployment rates between the two potential members. The negative reaction of the
49For a very related discussion, see Bolton and Roland (1997).
50For more details, see the Economist Intelligence Unit 2002 Country Pro¯le.
51The latest World Development Report ranks Switzerland 6th in the world in terms of GDP per capita,
with a GDP per capita more than 40 % above the EU average.
31Swiss electorate appears then to be consistent with the predictions of our model.
The predictions obtained in this paper are quite sharp, and it is worth stressing that they
depend on a series of important simplifying assumptions. First of all, in our setting, once the
common market is established, there will be no residual frictions a®ecting factor movements.
The EU experience has shown that this is largely the case for cross{border capital °ows,
but as far as labor movements are concerned, linguistic and cultural di®erences have often
represented an important obstacle, which we do not explicitly consider.52 Secondly, in our
setup, each country retains the power to autonomously set policies towards factor mobility
vis{µ a{vis the rest of the world. The \The Hague program"53 calls instead for a coordination
of migration policies at the EU level. Hence, it would be very interesting to extend our
model to explore the consequences of policy coordination on the political feasibility of the
Common Market.
Finally, the setting of the model is static, and a dynamic extension would allow to
tackle two important questions. On the one hand, we could analyze the impact of the
creation of a common market on the existing social security system of the perspective member
countries. This would be particularly important if there are substantial di®erences in the
age composition of the population like, for instance, in the case of the US and Mexico.
Alternatively, the dynamic impact of Foreign Direct Investment could be modeled explicitly,
highlighting the role of technological spillovers on welfare. While all these are very important
questions, we leave them for further research.
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